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REFLECTIONS ON "REFLECTIONS ON THE GREEK REVOLUTION" 
Mary Beard 
E. H. Gombrich's "Reflections on the Greek revolution" (Gombrich 1977, 99-125) 
offers one answer to a question frequently posed in ancient art history: how and why 
did Greek art develop so rapidly towards "naturalism" during the sixth and fifth century 
BC? But Gombrich's answer is unusual for two main reasons. First, his "Reflections" 
forms a chapter of his now classic Art and Illusion -- a wide-ranging study of style and 
interpretation in the visual arts; and so it provides an all too rare example of the 
integration of ancient art into the broader discipline of European art history. Secondly, it 
stands out from the intellectual barrenness of much specialist work on Greek art in its 
attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the explanation of the revolution in style. For 
this reason, it has often formed the jumping-off point for those archaeologists and art 
historians who have wished to do more than just date, order and attribute the surviving 
works of Archaic and Classical Greece; and it has often been seized upon by students left 
unsatisfied by the introverted connoisseurship practiced by the Classical establishment. 
This article will look at the argument of Gombrich's "Reflections". It will not 
concentrate specifically on the broad philosophical issues that underlie the whole of Art 
and Illusion (Gombrich 1977); for a critical review of these one can turn to Richard 
Wollheim's appraisal of the book, reprinted in his On Art and the Mind (Wollheim 1973, 
261-289), or to Norman Bryson's recent Vision and Painting (Bryson 1983). Its aim is to 
reveal for (I believe) the first time the flaws in the explanatory framework that 
Gombrich adopts for the rise of Greek art. Gombrich's chapter was at the time of its 
publication (1959) innovatory, and it remains even now an exciting and sometimes 
insightful piece; but it is, in my view, deeply misleading and provides an uncertain 
foundation for further work. 
The main lines of Gombrich's argument are clear enough. The "great 
awakening" of Greek sculpture and painting between the sixth and fifth centuries is 
contrasted with the essentially static quality of pre-Greek, Oriental and Egyptian art: the 
Greek Archaic kouros with its rigid, formal pose progressively gave way to the "lifelike" 
masterpieces of high classical sculpture; Egyptian carving and painting, on the other 
hand, never became illusionistic, but remained for all of its history conventionalized, 
even diagrammatic. How is this difference to be explained? Gombrich rejects any notion 
that the Egyptians and other pre- Greek cultures were simply less sophisticated than the 
Greeks. Their schematised art is not to be seen as somehow "childlike” in comparison   
 
208 
with that of the more "mature", "adult" Greeks. Instead the explanation is seen to lie in 
the difference of the function of art in pre-Greek and Greek cultures: Egyptian art was 
essentially totemic, embodying in its signs timeless events and timeless presences; 
Greek art was doing something different -- it was telling stories. The narrative function 
of Greek art and literature is what, in Gombrich's view, distinguishes the cultural 
achievements of the Greeks from those of their predecessors. The lifelike, illusionistic 
quality of Greek painting and sculpture stemmed from the artist's desire (just like the 
poet's) to capture the passing moment of the narrative story; it was the pressure 
towards vivid description (of such events as "The Judgement of Paris" or "The Sacrifice 
of Iphigeneia") that gave birth to Greek "realism". Once it was born, the constant, self-
generating process of testing and matching the artistic product against the literal 
"reality" of the observable world brought about the heights of illusionism associated 
with classical and post-classical Greek art. Reversal of the trend came only with cultural 
and intellectual shifts of the late Roman Empire: the growth of Christianity, absolute 
monarchy and the emergence once more of hieratic, totemic art. 
Gombrich's argument is seductive. He is a master of the winning line, the apparently 
apposite rhetorical question, the timely (if spurious) appeal to commonsense. The 
reader is carried along in agreement, lulled at the same time by Gombrich's certainty 
and his paraded diffidence: "narrative art is bound to lead to space and the exploration 
of visual effects" (Gombrich 1977, 118; my emphasis). Alternatively: "maybe taboos 
played their part in this sorting out process" (ibid, 123; my emphasis). And again: "the 
very fact that certain images had survived for immeasurable periods must have 
appeared as a token of their magic potency" (ibid, 107; my emphasis). 
It is hard on first, or even second, reading not to be convinced. I hope to show, however, 
that three major pivots of his argument -- the initiating rôle of the narrative, the 
continuing process of the refinement of "realism" and the breakdown of that process in 
the late Roman Empire cannot bear the weight assigned to them. On careful 
examination Gombrich's delicately balanced argument, with its artful rhetoric, collapses. 
The Initiating Rôle of Narrative 
Many scholars would now accept Gombrich's claim that the Greek revolution is to be 
explained by "a change in the whole function of art". "Naturalistic" Greek art was 
different from the "stereotyped" images of the Egyptians precisely because it fulfilled a 
different function in the cultural, political and the social life of the community. The 
problem is -- how is that different function to be identified and what is it that Greek art 
did that Egyptian art did not? Gombrich suggests that it is the story-telling function of 
Greek art that served to differentiate it from its predecessors and that acted as 
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a catalyst to the growth of stylistic naturalism; but this "solution" is produced as a rabbit 
out of a hat, by sleight of hand, ill-supported and ultimately unconvincing. 
Gombrich's arguments (such as they are) for the narrative catalyst come in two stages. 
First he observes that: 
Egyptian art scarcely knows any narrative illustration in our sense. There are no 
mythological cycles telling of the exploits of gods and heroes. ... Nor can the 
attitude of Mesopotamian cultures have differed greatly. (Gombrich 1977, 109) 
He then moves deftly from this (probably correct) observation to the simple hypothesis 
that: 
when classical sculptors and painters discovered the character of Greek 
narration, they set up a chain reaction which transformed the methods of 
representing the human body. (Gombrich 1977, 110) 
So far, so good -- as a starting point, as a working hypothesis to justify and evaluate 
against alternatives. But little justification or evaluation is forthcoming. 
The second stage of the argument offers some elaboration, but sidesteps the central 
issues. Gombrich attempts to justify his stress on the determining rôle of the Greek 
narrative tradition by an appeal to the uniqueness of Homer:- 
For what is the character of the Greek narration as we know it from Homer? 
Briefly, it is concerned not only with the "what" but also with the "how" of 
mythical events. Obviously this is not a strict distinction. There can be no recital 
of events that does not include description of one kind or another, and nobody 
would claim that the Gilgamesh Epic or the Old Testament is devoid of vivid 
accounts. But maybe there is still a difference in the way Homer presents the 
incidents in front of Troy, the very thoughts of the heroes, or the reaction of 
Hector's small son who takes fright from the plumes of his father's helmet. 
(Gombrich 1977, 110) 
  This will hardly do. The reader has been shifted from the problematic area of 
growth of a "naturalistic" style in Greek art to the adjacent (rather firmer) territory of 
early Greek epic; but even here Gombrich says nothing to convince the sceptic that 
Greek narrative practice is so special that it could plausibly account for the observed 
differences in Greek and (say) Egyptian artistic practice. As Gombrich 
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himself almost admits there are passages both in Gilgamesh and the Old Testament that 
lose nothing in vividness to Homer -- and his suggestion that "maybe there is still a 
difference" in Homer simply invites the response "but maybe not". 
Gombrich's argument at this crucial point is too elusive and brief to carry 
conviction. His claim that the "naturalistic" character of Greek art is to be related to the 
narrative function is neither trivial nor uninteresting. But he fails to show why narrative 
should take the centre of the stage. There are other plausible catalysts in artistic 
change. Why should we follow Gombrich in privileging narrative rather than framing an 
explanation in terms of the rise of the city-state, for example, or the social and 
economic changes of Archaic Greece? The initiating rôle of narrative forms the assumed 
base of much of these influential "Reflections". Yet that rôle is never adequately 
justified. 
The Refinement of "Realism": Making and Matching 
Once the "realistic" mode is established, it is, in Gombrich's view, constantly 
refined by a process of "making and matching". The artist tests his product against the 
reality of the observable world and tries, at each new rendering, to capture that reality 
more faithfully. In this way, the familiar progression of Greek art towards "naturalism" is 
assured: each generation of artists "matches" the observable world "better" than their 
predecessors. 
The process of "making and matching" underlies much of the argument of Art 
and Illusion as a whole and is one of the themes of the book most challenged by 
Gombrich's critics. My concern here is not to enter the theoretical debates that have 
surrounded the concept (for which, again, see Bryson's Vision and Painting [Bryson 
1983]) but to suggest that, whatever its theoretical validity, the idea of "making and 
matching" provides a peculiarly inappropriate way of understanding the Greek material 
with which Gombrich is concerned in the "Reflections". 
The visual representations most prominent in Gombrich's "Reflections" are 
representations of deities and other mythical beings. The particular examples on which 
Gombrich lays most stress are two versions on painted pottery of "The Judgement of 
Paris" (Gombrich 1977, 111, Figures 87 and 88) -- the first, a sixth century, still "hieratic" 
representation in which the god Hermes is seen leading three rather "unlifelike" 
goddesses to the beauty contest; the second, a much more "plausible" rendering of the 
fifth century, in which the individual characterization of the goddesses (the "dignified 
reserve" of Hera, for example) offers the viewer a now convincing image of the scene. 
By the fifth century artists have reworked the static, rigid images of the sixth century; 
they have "amended the formula" so as to match "reality" more closely. 
The problem is that these mythical images chosen by Gombrich have 
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no external reality against which the artist can be imagined to have "tested" his 
rendering. It is one thing to imagine that representations of (say) trees were constantly 
matched against observable reality and so constantly "improved" -- though even here I, 
like others, am doubtful about the argument. It is quite another to suggest that images 
of gods and goddesses developed by a similar process. For in this case there was no 
external reality against which they could be matched;  their "reality" consisted in 
whatever image was chosen for their representation. Gombrich might, of course, object 
that Greek deities were "anthropomorphic" and that consequently men and women of 
the world provided the fixed point against which to match and test. But such an 
objection would be seriously to under-estimate the subtlety of Greek religion. The 
construction of the gods' appearance was itself the subject of (implicit) debate: were 
they just like men and women or were they not? how were they distinguished as divine? 
was it by size? by dress? by colour? how indeed could certainty be reached? Visual 
images provided one important medium for that debate, parading different options in 
all kinds of different representations. It was no accident that some gods (like temple cult 
images) were portrayed in gold and ivory, immense and shining, while others were in 
the likeness of a perfect athlete: these were all valid explorations of a culturally agreed, 
yet constantly shifting, imaginative construction of the divine. From a modern analytical 
perspective, it was the image that constituted the reality of the god or goddess; the 
image did not, and could not, attempt to replicate yet more faithfully some actual 
presence in the observable world. 
Gombrich fails to recognise the inappropriateness of any process of "making 
and matching" where the image necessarily represents the only "reality" the subject can 
ever have. It cannot be that his fifth century version of "The Judgement of Paris" is more 
"realistic" than that of the sixth century. The older version represents simply a different 
attempt at claiming a reality for the incident. In just the same way, there can be no 
more or less lifelike representation of (say) a unicorn; there are only different ways of 
"imaging". 
The End of Realism 
Gombrich's arguments finally break down when he comes to the period of the 
later Roman empire and what he perceives as a retreat from realism. Why, he asks, 
were "the achievements of Greek illusionism" gradually discarded? He rejects with 
paraded reluctance the view that art simply declined -- for that explanation "has 
become unfashionable" (Gombrich 1977, 125). And besides, as he goes on to say, "it is 
hard to use such a word (as decline) when one stands in San Vitale in Ravenna". (ibid, 
125). 
Instead he sees, once more, a change in the function of art. This time the 
triumph of Christianity is seen to have brought back pre-Greek conceptions of 
"schematic" art, conceived not as "free fiction", but as 
    
 
212 
the "timeless re-enactment of the life of Christ" and the representation of eternal truths 
(ibid, 125). He adds: "Small wonder that (this conception of art) led to a concentration 
on distinctive features and came to restrict the free play of the imagination in artist and 
beholder alike" (ibid, 125). 
Gombrich's difficulties are understandable. Once he has depicted the 
developments of Greek art as a process of "making and matching", with a constant 
progression to a more faithful image, he is left almost resourceless in the face of the 
clear trend away from realism in the later Roman Empire. He would like, of course, to 
claim a retreat from narrative in the art and culture of this later period and so reverse 
the functional argument that he adopted for the beginning of Greek realism. Yet he has 
to recognise that in the life of Christ the artists of the period were representing, like 
their predecessors, a vivid and important narrative story. He can only sidestep and 
invent a convenient, if unconvincing, distinction: while earlier Greco-Roman artists were 
recreating "free fiction", their Christian counterparts were engaged in "timeless re-
enactments". This leads him, perhaps in desperation, to make his extraordinary 
assertion that the imagination not only of the artist but also of the viewer was restricted 
by such developments as we see at Ravenna and in Byzantine art. 
The difficulties with which Gombrich here wrestles unsuccessfully are an 
indication of the generally unsatisfactory nature of his explanatory model. It is not that 
it cannot simply be reversed in order to provide an explanation for the reversal of the 
trend towards realism. It is more fundamentally that Gombrich's failure (both here and 
with modern non-figurative art) to deal with what for him must be "hiccoughs" in his 
developmental scheme calls his explanatory model yet further into question. 
Conclusion 
"Reflections on the Greek revolution" is deeply flawed at the major pivotal 
points of its argument. This is not to say that an argument on the crucial role of 
narrative in the development of early Greek art could not be convincingly framed -- but 
simply that Gombrich has not achieved conviction. Nor do the faults in this one chapter 
of Art and Illusion imply a blanket rejection of Gombrich's work; he has after all 
produced some modifications to his general hypotheses in his more recent writing. 
"Reflections" has, however, remained a key text for archaeologists and classical art 
historians. For this reason its particular faults need to be stated. 
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